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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Abstract 
In the face of both declining budgets and growing interoperability requirements, the military 
increasingly wants to consolidate multiple needs into single systems to be developed jointly. 
Unfortunately, the track record for joint system acquisition programs is mixed, and programs 
often follow a familiar downward spiral: 
The stakeholder programs that depend on a joint system may be skeptical, fearing 
the needed capability will neither meet their needs, nor be delivered as promised. 
Stakeholders pressure the Joint Program Office (JPO) to accommodate individual 
requirements, and the JPO may reluctantly agree, driving up cost, schedule, 
complexity, and risk—thus realizing the stakeholders’ worst fears. These 
performance issues encourage stakeholders to leave the joint program, potentially 
rendering it both operationally unattractive and financially infeasible.  
This exemplifies a classic social dilemma called the “Tragedy of the Commons.” Much work 
has been done on mitigating social dilemmas, but a solution’s success depends on its 
context. This paper describes the modeling of organizational decision-making in a joint 
acquisition program using system dynamics.  This permits future work to analyze the 
effectiveness of different social dilemma mitigations within the context of joint programs by 
using system dynamics.  
Introduction 
The failure of acquisition programs to deliver high-quality systems within cost and 
schedule constraints (GAO, 2005)—especially those developing software-reliant systems—
is all too common in modern government acquisition. These recurring failures have a direct 
adverse impact on the ability of the Department of Defense (DoD) to be able to support the 
warfighter with the systems they need. Delayed systems withhold needed capability, and 
wasted resources drain budgets that could be used to develop other systems.  
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) has a unique insight into these failures from 
regularly conducting Independent Technical Assessments (ITAs) on specific programs to 
determine why they are experiencing difficulties. These investigations have provided 
visibility into the processes and forces at work within these programs and have produced an 
understanding of the most common ways that programs come to face serious challenges. 
Acquisition programs do not fail solely for technical reasons. Organizational, management, 
and cultural issues are an additional set of significant reasons why acquisition programs 
may substantially exceed budget, overrun schedule, deliver inadequate quality, and 
ultimately even fail (Frangos, 1998; Madachy, 2008). 
This paper describes research that is being conducted to better understand the joint 
acquisition program dilemma and to investigate approaches to mitigate associated 
problems. The general approach is to use a causal loop diagram (CLD) as a means to 
capture a current understanding of the problem based on past experience in both consulting 
on joint programs and in conducting ITAs. The CLD embodies an evolving theory of the joint 
acquisition dilemma that is updated and refined through a series of workshops held with joint 
program domain experts and decision-makers. The evolving theory is further explored by 
developing the CLD into a fully executable system dynamics model. Data collected during 
workshops help to guide, correct, and validate important aspects of the model. When the 
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model adequately captures the joint program dilemma, it can be used to investigate 
mitigations to the problem through additional modeling of different mitigation approaches. 
Ultimately, the most promising mitigations can be evaluated in the workshop context and 
potentially in pilot tests during the execution of actual joint acquisitions. 
The subsequent portions of this paper describe the progress that has been made in 
conducting this research. The section Social Dilemmas and Joint Programs describes the 
typical flow of joint acquisition program events. The section System Dynamics Background 
provides an introduction to the system dynamics modeling approach. The section Workshop 
with Domain Experts describes the workshops that have been held thus far, and the primary 
insights gained. The section The Joint Program Simulation Model describes the current 
state of a system dynamics simulation model refined based on feedback provided during 
these workshops. Key behaviors exhibited by the model support the hypothesis that joint 
programs suffer from the “Tragedy of the Commons” social dilemma and that joint program 
participants may get caught in a trap that can lead to the demise of the program. The 
section Mitigations for the Joint Program Dilemma describes the space of potential 
mitigations and solutions to the problems illustrated. Finally, the paper concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of this work and some future opportunities. 
Joint Programs 
The category of programs known as “joint” programs constitute a special case within 
DoD acquisition. Such programs intend to provide a system, subsystem, or capability that 
will fulfill needs of, and be funded or managed by, more than one DoD service or 
component. Joint programs are appealing because they offer at least two significant 
potential benefits: (1) reducing costs by developing one system as opposed to several 
differing ones and (2) improving interoperability by providing a single system or capability 
that can be used for multiple purposes in multiple contexts. Joint programs are recognized 
as being difficult to manage because they have multiple stakeholder programs intending to 
use the joint capability (often with differing needs), they may be larger in size than other 
programs, they may be more complex organizationally, and they may be geographically 
dispersed—all causing increased levels of coordination, communication, and negotiation 
overhead. At the same time, joint programs are becoming increasingly important to the 
military as the need for interoperability grows and as there is greater pressure on the overall 
defense budget to reduce costs.  
Although the focus of most acquisition programs is on the complex system being 
developed, it may be overlooked that acquisition programs themselves, especially joint 
programs, are complex, dynamic systems—and as such can display unpredictable and even 
seemingly chaotic behavior. This results from the presence of feedback between the 
autonomous actors populating different groups within the acquisition organization. Feedback 
in the system produces non-linear behavior, where changes in the system’s outputs may no 
longer be proportional to changes to the inputs. The complexity of this feedback, inherent in 
any system involving interacting human beings, coupled with time delays between inputs 
and outputs that obscure the relationships between cause and effect, can produce 
unexpected behavior in even simple systems. Such systems must be analyzed as a whole 
in order to understand their behavior, because the problematic behaviors often emerge 
directly as a result of these interactions—and vanish when the system is decomposed into 
its component pieces for study.  
Misaligned Incentives in Acquisition 
It has been concluded in studies (Kadish, 2006; Pennock, 2008) that the incentives 
at work in acquisition policy and governance are often misaligned. These misalignments can 
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cause a disconnect between the desired outcome and the most promising ways of achieving 
that outcome. The result of misaligned incentives can be shortsighted acquisition decision-
making, potentially putting short-term interests ahead of longer term interests, or individual 
and program interests ahead of PEO and service interests, thus turning planned cooperation 
into opposition.  
Many of the misaligned incentives seen in acquisition belong to a category of 
problems known as social dilemmas. Social dilemmas are ubiquitous across human 
organizations. They describe situations in which the incentives align to promote a solution 
by the actors involved that may be locally optimal but will be suboptimal at a more global 
level.  
One common type of social dilemma is called a “social trap” (Cross & Guyer, 1980; 
Kollock, 1998). In a group context, a social trap means that an individual desires a benefit to 
himself that will cost everyone else—but if all in the group succumb to the same temptation, 
then everyone is worse off. A social trap is often referred to colloquially as a “Tragedy of the 
Commons”2 (Hardin, 1968). What is noteworthy about this dilemma is that there is no intent 
to destroy the common resource—it’s the combined actions of all acting in their own self-
interest that lead to the tragic result.  
Social dilemmas come in many different forms, with many different properties, which 
helps to make them both difficult to recognize and difficult to fix. The next section outlines 
social dilemmas in the context of a joint program.  
Social Dilemmas and Joint Programs 
Joint programs are noted for the unique challenges that they face organizationally 
(Lindsay, 2006), due in part to the tension between the individual programs and services 
needing to look out for their own interests and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 that stresses the importance of all service branches 
working together both effectively and efficiently. Because of this seeming paradox, there is a 
fundamental social dilemma at the heart of every joint program that can be seen in the 
following narrative, which summarizes the experiences of a number of joint and joint-style 
programs that the SEI has worked with: 
A joint program has six stakeholder programs all planning to integrate the 
joint infrastructure software that is being developed to meet a common 
baseline set of requirements. However, each stakeholder program then also 
requests that one or more significant new requirements be added to satisfy 
some custom needs of that specific stakeholder program. Although reluctant, 
the joint program manager agrees to the new requirements out of fear of 
losing stakeholder programs, who might leave the joint program to build their 
own custom software. As development proceeds, the additional requirements 
and their resulting design changes and incremental development significantly 
increase the total cost, schedule, complexity, and risk of the joint 
development effort. As the schedule begins to slip, one stakeholder program 
realizes that the joint program has put the stakeholder in danger of missing its 
own schedule, and so it leaves the joint program to develop its own software. 
                                                
2 The original story of the “Tragedy of the Commons” from the 19th century envisions a group of 
herders sharing an area of grazing land called a commons. If one herder decides to graze an extra 
animal, then that herder receives more benefit from the commons than the others, and at no 
additional cost to himself. However, if all of the herders follow suit and add more animals according to 
the same reasoning, they eventually reach the point where the grass is eaten faster than it can grow, 
the cattle begin to starve, and ultimately all of the herders lose their livelihood. 
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Although one stakeholder program has left the joint program, the incremental 
cost of the more complex architecture that was designed to support the 
stakeholder’s desired capability cannot be recouped. The schedule delays 
from the increased complexity and risk impact the remaining stakeholder 
programs as well, and soon another stakeholder program chooses to leave 
the joint program. Exacerbated by the effort spent in re-planning the joint 
effort each time a stakeholder program leaves, costs continue to escalate, 
and the development schedule lengthens. The remaining stakeholder 
programs begin to reconsider their participation in the joint program, and 
ultimately participation unravels and collapses. 
With this narrative in mind, a joint program can be viewed as a “Tragedy of the 
Commons” in which the commons is the development resource of the joint program office 
and the contractor. The entire program and the stakeholder programs are collectively worse 
off if the stakeholder programs choose to exploit the development resource for their 
individual gain by insisting on having custom requirements developed.  
It is important to note that a “Tragedy of the Commons” situation does not always 
occur in a joint program. It may be the case that strong leadership from the joint program 
manager, or a highly cooperative culture within the program, will prevent it from happening. 
However, given the fact that the incentives align to favor unilateral action by the stakeholder 
programs and their services, unless specific preventative steps are taken, preventing this 
social trap is more likely to be the exception rather than the rule. 
The next section provides context for the creation of a system dynamics model of 
this behavior. 
System Dynamics Background 
The system dynamics method helps analysts model and analyze critical behavior as 
it evolves over time within complex socio-technical domains. A key tenet of this method is 
that the dynamic complexity of critical behavior can be captured by the underlying feedback 
structure of that behavior. The boundaries of a system dynamics model are drawn so that all 
of the enterprise elements necessary to generate and understand problematic behavior are 
contained within them. The method has a long history, as described in Sterman (2000) and 
Meadows (2008). 
System dynamics and the related area of systems thinking encourage the inclusion 
of “soft” factors in the model such as policy, procedural, administrative, and cultural aspects. 
The exclusion of soft factors in other modeling techniques effectively treats their influence as 
negligible, which is often an inappropriate assumption. This holistic modeling perspective 
helps identify mitigations to problematic behaviors that are often overlooked by other 
approaches. 
Figure 1 summarizes the notation used by system dynamics modeling. The primary 
elements are variables of interest, stocks (which represent collection points of resources), 
and flows (which represent the transition of resources between stocks). Signed arrows 
represent causal relationships, where the sign indicates how the variable at the arrow’s 
source influences the variable at the arrow’s target. A positive (S) influence indicates that 
the values of the variables move in the same direction, whereas a negative (O) influence 
indicates that they move in opposite directions. A connected group of variables, stocks, and 
flows can create a path that is referred to as a feedback loop. There are two types of 
feedback loops: balancing and reinforcing. The type of feedback loop is determined by 
counting the number of negative influences along the path of the loop. An odd number of 
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negative influences indicates a balancing loop; an even (or zero) number of negative 
influences indicates a reinforcing loop.  
Significant feedback loops identified within the model described here are indicated by 
a loop symbol and a loop name in italics. Balancing loops—indicated with the label B 
followed by an identifying number in the loop symbol—describe aspects of the system that 
oppose change, seeking to drive variables to some equilibrium goal state. Balancing loops 
often represent actions that an organization takes to manage, or mitigate a problem. 
Reinforcing loops—indicated with a label R followed by a number in the loop symbol—
describe system aspects that tend to drive variable values consistently either upward or 
downward. Reinforcing loops often represent the escalation of problems but may include 
problem mitigation behaviors. 
 
 System Dynamics Notation 
The next section discusses how the system dynamics modeling process was used to 
elicit a detailed understanding of joint program behavior from subject matter experts.  
Workshop With Domain Experts 
A series of problem elaboration workshops3 is being used as the primary method for 
gaining feedback from acquisition subject matter experts on the current system dynamics 
model, and for eliciting suggestions for additional potential improvements. To date, a 
shortened pilot version of the problem elaboration workshop has been conducted with 
                                                
3 These workshops are covered by the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) human subject research 
policy, and protocol HS12-237 for conducting these workshops has been approved by the CMU 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Nothing discussed at the workshops is tied to a specific individual or 
organization. 
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internal SEI acquisition experts as well as a full two-day workshop with program office and 
contractor personnel from a single joint program.  
The problem elaboration workshops are intended to consist of personnel drawn from 
a single joint program. Ideally each workshop will include a mix of program management 
and technical personnel as well as personnel from both the acquirer and developer side. 
The workshops last approximately two days in order to cover a substantial portion of the 
relevant material. The top-level causal loop diagram of the dynamic is reviewed as a high-
level abstraction of the model because reviewing the entire system dynamics model is not 
feasible for the acquisition subject matter experts. 
There are two primary goals for each problem elaboration workshop: (1) discuss the 
current top-level loops in the model causal loop diagram and have the participants rate the 
importance and accuracy of each loop using a Likert scale and (2) gain insight from the 
participants on any loops/interactions that may have been overlooked. The initial workshop 
focused on a joint program designed to provide a joint communication capability needed by 
several services that was to be deployed on a number of different platforms to allow for 
effective communication between platforms belonging to multiple services. The participants 
included personnel who had worked at the government program office and personnel from 
the prime contractor. The workshops were effective in achieving their goals, and some of the 
results are summarized as follows. 
Goal 1: Rating the top-level loops. After presentation and discussion of all of the top-
level loops in the CLD of the large model (see Table 1 in Appendix A for high-level 
descriptions of those loops and Figure 11 in Appendix B for a graphical depiction), ratings 
were obtained from all participants. Nine of the 12 loops in the CLD (75%) were rated above 
moderately important. In seven (i.e., 58%) of the loops, the average accuracy score was 
rated above moderately accurate. Of these seven loops rated above moderately accurate, 
four of these loops (33% of the original 12) were rated above very accurate. For all 12 loops, 
at least one of the four participants rated themselves as extremely experienced in this area, 
and all loops had at least two participants who rated themselves as very or extremely 
experienced. Based on the feedback from the participants, one section of the CLD that 
scored lower in importance was modified in order to change how stakeholder programs may 
influence others to defect, or leave the joint program. 
Goal 2: Overlooked loops/interactions. The workshop participants discussed nine 
additional interactions that they thought had been important on their joint program. The top 
area they thought should be added addressed launching the program properly. The model 
was modified to address this area, and additional ways of implementing this concept are 
being explored. A second area that was identified as needing to be addressed is the level of 
capability of the government staff, and this has been added to the model as well. 
Feedback from actual program personnel is critical to ensuring that the model 
includes the most important top-level interactions. It is also critical to tuning the model 
parameters to best simulate the performance of joint programs. Additional problem 
elaboration workshops are planned for the near future to continue to refine the model.  
The Joint Program Simulation Model 
As described previously, the problem elaboration workshop attendees were 
presented with a CLD that already described many aspects of joint program behavior. The 
feedback from these domain experts made it possible to assess the most important aspects 
of the joint program problem, many of which were included in the original CLD and some of 
which were not. This information was used to develop a simpler and more focused CLD that 
better represents the inherent social dilemma and other central aspects of the joint program 
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dilemma as seen by the workshop participants. Appendix B contains this refined CLD.4 As 
additional workshops are conducted, other aspects may be included or excluded from the 
CLD based on the findings of those workshops. 
The only loops retained in this simpler model are the stakeholder custom 
requirements acceptance (B3), pressure-induced rework (R3), and pressure-induced 
attrition (R4), as described in Appendices A and B. The first two of these were the top two 
rated feedback loops at the workshop. The third, which is closely related to the second, 
occurs in most joint programs and causes significant turmoil and lost productivity. Also 
included is one of the two highest rated extensions proposed to the original model: The 
inclusion of Joint Program Office (JPO) efforts to keep the joint program sold to stakeholders 
was deemed a key contributing factor to endemic problems and inefficiencies.  The top-
rated extension that was suggested at the workshop, the distinction between acquiring 
capabilities as opposed to acquiring systems, will be addressed explicitly in future versions 
of the model.    
The system dynamics method provides a way of implementing a CLD, so as to 
further explore the implications of the causal structure as it is elaborated in more detail. 
These implications are assessed through simulation (execution) of the model. In addition to 
the confidence gained in the CLD during the workshops, simulation can result in additional 
confidence that the causal structure can indeed produce the behavior implied by the 
qualitative CLD. Once the model has been shown to exhibit the expected behavior, 
workshop interactions can help ensure that it does so for the correct reasons. This level of 
validation then allows the analyst to use the model to test alternate solutions to the problem 
using the system dynamics simulation capability. 
The simulation and analysis of the joint program model is still ongoing, and it is the 
initial results of that effort that are presented here. The feedback that was received in the 
initial problem elaboration workshop made it possible to simplify and focus the original 
simulation model that had been developed. The three primary segments of the current 
simulation model are described in order: the Stakeholder Program Segment, the Joint 
Program Office (JPO) Segment, and the Developer Segment. Each of the stakeholder 
programs, the JPO, and the developer have reasons to be at least comparatively satisfied 
based on the progression of events thus far, early on in the joint program acquisition. 
However, as will be seen in the subsequent section, Systemic Effects, their relative 
satisfaction will be spoiled due to the diminishing returns associated with joint program 
expenditures. 
 The current model makes the following assumptions about the joint 
acquisition program: 
 The timeline of the simulation is 120 months—10 years—but the conclusion 
of the project may be significantly short of that, and vary depending on the 
input parameters. Milestone B occurs 12 months into the simulation, and that 
is when the development contract is awarded. 
 The joint program has three stakeholder programs that negotiate with the 
JPO for their own custom requirements separate from a set of baseline 
requirements. The stakeholder programs are referred to abstractly as S1, S2, 
and S3.  
                                                
4 Note that CLDs and system dynamics models share a similar notation. The primary difference is that 
CLDs do not include stocks or flows. They are strictly qualitative and so are not executable. 
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 Funding for the joint program is spent strictly on development activities. JPO 
staff can rotate out and be hired in, but the staff levels stay at generally the 
same level and do not consume funding (e.g., they are on overhead, as far as 
the model is concerned). 
 Developer staff are separated into new staff versus experienced staff, each 
with their own levels of productivity (i.e., computer software configuration 
items (CSCIs)5 developed/tested per month) and monthly costs. Experienced 
staff may have their time partially consumed by training new staff. 
These assumptions may be relaxed in future revisions to the model to allow a broader range 
of behaviors to be tested.  
It should be noted that although the model described as follows has been refined 
both by the problem elaboration workshop sessions and through the acquisition experience 
of the modeling team itself, this model has not yet been validated with historical joint 
program data to help quantify the relationships between the model variables. This validation 
will be conducted, but at this point, the model should be viewed as providing only tentative 
support for the causal hypothesis. 
Stakeholder Program Segment 
A primary concern of the stakeholder programs is getting their (custom) requirements 
implemented by the joint program so that they have the most usable system possible when 
the joint program completes development. There is a fair amount of negotiation going on 
during these times between the joint program office and the stakeholder programs, and the 
initial model is based on the foundations of negotiation and cooperation theory. Other work 
in developing system dynamics models has leveraged some of this theory in the past. This 
model is based explicitly on models developed by Darling and Richardson (1990).  
As illustrated in Figure 2, stakeholder program decision-making is based on the 
following: 
 Stakeholder program gain (the inner loop in the figure). The extent to which 
the stakeholder program’s custom requirements are implemented in the joint 
system. In terms outlined by Darling, this gain limits the stakeholder 
program’s problem potential. An effect function6 is used to capture the 
framing effects of Darling’s model, which is used to determine whether the 
extent of the stakeholder program’s gain is viewed positively or negatively. 
 Stakeholder program’s relative gain (the outer loop in the figure). The 
stakeholder program’s satisfaction is also dependent on how much they 
perceive others are gaining relative to their own gain. If they think others are 
getting proportionally more, then they will be less satisfied even if they are 
still getting their own needs met adequately. This is a refinement of Darling’s 
model, which was based on a weighted sum of the gain for self and the 
perceived gain of other stakeholder programs. 
o A more recent perception of gains weighs more in stakeholder program 
decision-making than older perceptions. This relates to the moving 
average used in the Darling model, which models how past outcomes 
influence present expectations. 
                                                
5 A CSCI is a collection of software that supports a specific function for the end user. 
6 An effect function is a device used in system dynamics modeling that explicitly describes the 
mathematical relationship between two specific model variables over time.  
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o The possibility that a stakeholder program may have only a limited 
understanding of other stakeholder programs’ gains (Darling’s “Fixed 
Pie Bias”) is handled with a weighted formula. To the extent that 
understanding is incomplete (i.e., knowledge of other’s gain is less than 
1), a stakeholder program assumes that their loss is the other 
stakeholder program’s gain. 
Initial discussion with joint program decision-makers suggests that concern for 
fairness, as described in Darling’s model, is not a primary factor in stakeholder program 
decision-making, so it has been omitted from the simplified model presented here. It is, 
however, still a factor in the larger model being developed. 
A stakeholder program’s satisfaction influences both the extent of their buy-in to the 
joint program and their cooperation with the joint program goals. Both buy-in and 
cooperation with the joint program are needed to keep the program viable. When either is 
lagging, the JPO will tend to implement more of the stakeholder program’s custom 
requirements to keep the stakeholder program engaged. 
 
 Stakeholder Programs Negotiate for Custom Requirements Beyond Baseline 
This effect can result in an escalation of custom requirements, which of course must 
then be integrated with the original requirements. The model initial settings are set to an 
equilibrium. At Month 18, to test the behavior of the model, the demands of stakeholder S1 
are stepped up to a level of 0.8 on a scale of 0 to 1. This perturbation from equilibrium 
shows in Figure 3 that increases in one stakeholder program’s demands leads to increases 
in other stakeholder programs’ demands. Although the levels do not rise to the same 
degree, the escalation of custom requirements that result are necessary from the joint 
program perspective in order to maintain stakeholder programs’ buy-in and prevent 
stakeholders from defecting. 
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 Increase in Custom Requirements Acceptance for S1 With Subsequent Rise for 
S2 and S37 
In the Darling model, this behavior reflects the “competitive drift” possible, where one 
negotiator is pitted directly against another and the interaction between negotiators 
becomes increasingly acrimonious. In the joint program case, the JPO may feel compelled 
to give in to stakeholder program demands across the board, directly supporting the creation 
and reinforcement of the underlying social dilemma. With greater support being given to 
their individual needs, the stakeholder programs remain relatively satisfied. 
Joint Program Office (JPO) Segment 
The benefit of keeping stakeholder programs “bought in” to the joint program is 
evident in Figure 4. More engaged program stakeholders promote DoD buy-in. Once the 
development starts, especially with the additional custom requirements accepted, plus-ups 
on funding and extensions to the schedule are usually necessary to implement the 
additional functionality. 
                                                
7 This and subsequent graphs were generated using the Vensim modeling tool. These are all 
behavior-over-time graphs, and as such, the x-axis for these graphs is specified in months (120 
months—10 years—is the duration of this simulation). Each simulation run is specified as individual 
graphs distinguished with a number label (1 through 3 in Figure 3), as specified in the legend below 
the graph.  
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 Additional Funding Increments to Implement Expanded Scope 
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 Additional Schedule Extensions to Implement Expanded Scope 
 
Developer Segment 
The additional development work generated due to the additional custom 
requirements from the stakeholder platforms is shown in the middle of Figure 7. This 
additional development work, along with the development work from the originally planned 
baseline, is added to the development work remaining. Both development and testing work 
is accomplished based on the productivity of the development staff, shown on the left side of 
the figure. 
 
 Development Staff Managed to Complete Development Work 
Development staff is split between new hires and experienced staff, with some 
training period (possibly on-the-job) needed to transition from new to experienced. The 
development productivity levels of new and experienced staff differs, with experienced staff 
spending some of their time training the newer staff. All charges made by the staff for their 
time working on the project are reflected in the cumulative contractor (i.e., developer) 
revenue. As shown in Figure 8, the contractor’s revenue rises well above the baseline 
levels, partially due to implementing the additional custom requirements demanded by the 
stakeholder programs. In this context, assuming that the contractual negotiations are 
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providing additional revenue for the additional employees, the contractor is willing (if not 
even happy) to employ more staff for a longer period. 
 
 Developer Revenue Rises Well Above the Baseline Level8 
 
Systemic Effects 
Although the stakeholder programs, the JPO, and the developer accomplish 
important objectives in their own domains, these objectives act as a trap for joint program 
decision-makers that can potentially lead to the demise of the joint program. Figure 9 shows 
the diminishing returns related to the joint program investment to develop the extended joint 
system. As the number of custom requirements accepted for each stakeholder program 
increases along the x-axis, the average cost per CSCI increases by a factor of 5 to 10 over 
the average cost per CSCI in the baseline development. Another dimension, along the z-
axis, shows that as the realism of schedule setting decreases from 1 to 0.1, the CSCI cost 
ratio declines even further. As a result of the simulation and analysis of this scenario, 
representations of complex decision surfaces such as shown in Figure 9 allow decision-
makers to understand the interactions between multiple factors within a system, and to 
understand the range of possible outcomes based on various actions. 
                                                
8 Development is complete about Month 30 in the Baseline simulation run and about Month 47 in the 
Current run. 
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 Systemic Result: Diminishing Returns in Development Effort Lead to Cost 
Increases for Program 
The overview model, shown in Figure 10, integrates the stakeholder program 
segment, the JPO segment, and the developer segment described previously. The model 
also illustrates the primary influences causing the diminishing returns: 
 Complexity-Induced Rework (in blue in the lower middle of the figure)—The 
system complexity that results from program stakeholder custom 
requirements decreases average development productivity and increases the 
rates of defect injection during development. The increased system 
complexity increases the complexity of developing individual CSCI for a 
variety of reasons, making development take longer and be more error prone. 
 JPO Staffing Effects on Program Execution (in green in the lower middle of 
the figure)—The resource demands on the JPO staff, as described previously 
in the JPO segment, causes two primary problems for the developers. First, 
the JPO staff is not as responsive to developer demands for guidance, and 
for review and feedback on development artifacts. This reduces the average 
developer productivity. The second effect is that the JPO staff shortcuts the 
quality of their guidance and review process. This leads to lower quality in the 
development, and greater amounts of rework. 
 Pressure-Induced Rework (the red reinforcing feedback loop)—The 
expansion of the joint system scope leads to the need for extensions to the 
schedule well beyond those planned for the original baseline system. 
Although the need for schedule extensions is widely recognized, they may 
come infrequently at unpredictable times, and only if decision-makers remain 
adequately bought in. The result is intense schedule pressure, which may be 
evident even early in the program if the initial schedule was unrealistic. Such 
schedule pressure can lead to bypassing some quality processes, and to the 
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generation of higher levels of rework. This acts in a reinforcing manner as 
schedule pressure escalates even further. 
 Pressure-Induced Attrition (the purple reinforcing feedback loop)—
Development staff may suffer the most from schedule pressure. When 
development staff are in high demand, attrition may grow. Despite new 
development staff being hired, the average and thus the overall productivity 
may fall, making it even harder to meet schedule demands. This reinforcing 
dynamic exacerbates the problem further. 
This section described the hypotheses about why joint programs can get trapped into 
a development of diminishing returns. The four causes for these diminishing returns, 
described previously, provide a view of what can go wrong. Mitigation of this problem may 
involve developing a means to avoid falling into the trap in the first place or for reducing the 
negative consequences associated with falling in the trap. The next section describes some 
of the considerations regarding problem mitigation. 
Mitigations for the Joint Program Dilemma 
The rationale for identifying a possible inherent social dilemma at work within the 
structure of a joint program is to understand the mechanism by which these types of 
acquisition programs can encounter difficulties. Once the mechanism has been confirmed, 
there is a large set of mitigations and solution approaches that have been developed in 
different academic disciplines such as game theory, behavioral economics, social science, 
and social psychology, with each addressing differences in the specifics of the instance of 
the dilemma. Elinor Ostrom received the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics for her study of 
innovative solutions that have evolved in different cultures to address differing instances of 
the “Tragedy of the Commons.” However, these academic solutions are not well known to 
the software-intensive acquisition or software development communities and thus have not 
yet been studied in the context of acquisition programs, so their applicability is still unknown. 
The goal, however, remains the same—to deploy higher quality systems to the field in a 
more timely and cost-effective manner.  
The research literature organizes the solutions to social dilemmas such as the 
“Tragedy of the Commons” into three classes: 
 Motivational. Motivational solutions assume that participants are not exclusively 
self-interested and thus care about the consequences of their actions on other 
participants. Because of this, such concerns as values and group identity, as well 
as communication, can be effective.  
 Strategic. Strategic solutions assume that participants are exclusively self-
interested and so require that the participants influence how the other 
participants behave, thus producing a better outcome for themselves. Robert 
Axelrod (1984) provided three ingredients for such approaches: (1) long-term 
relationships among the participants (so that all expect shared dilemmas in their 
future), (2) that the participants can identify one another, and (3) that participants 
are aware of the past behavior of each other.  
 Structural. Structural solutions require changing the rules of the situation so that 
the nature of the dilemma also changes. The most significant difficulties with 
applying structural solutions is that (1) they require a level of authority to 
implement, (2) they may bring about resistance from those who are affected, and 
(3) they require methods (with accompanying costs) to ensure compliance with 
the new rules.  
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The first two classes (i.e., motivational and strategic) do not require changing the 
fundamental structure of the situation, and as a result, they tend to be simpler to 
implement—although their effectiveness is less certain when compared to a structural 
solution. 
To discuss one common approach to resolving a social trap,9 the use of an authority 
to manage the commons is widely used in practice. However, this approach may have side 
effects, depending on how the leader was selected and from which organization, since the 
perceived objectivity and neutrality of the leader is essential to their acceptance by the 
participants. 
Another widely used approach is privatization, which, like the use of authority, also 
has side effects. By removing the social aspect of the social dilemma, it eliminates the 
interdependence between people by converting shared ownership to private ownership. 
However, this would result in each of the stakeholder programs building their own custom 
system, which is antithetical to the originally intended outcome. 
Another approach that could produce a better outcome might be altruistic 
punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002). In altruistic punishment, cooperating participants may 
penalize uncooperative participants through some mechanism (such as withholding a small 
funding increment) at a small cost to themselves. Participants seem willing to do this, 
despite the cost—and even if it will yield no direct material gain to them. Fehr and Gachter’s 
research indicated that cooperation increases if altruistic punishment is possible and may 
break down if it is ruled out. In addition, imposing a cost on the administering party 
disincentivizes overuse, making it self-correcting.  
Such a solution could help to avoid the requests for additional capabilities and 
prevent the downward spiral due to a lengthening schedule and increasing cost, complexity, 
and risk, thus incentivizing stakeholder programs to stay with the joint program, rather than 
defect. However, this particular solution to the social trap may or may not be feasible for use 
on a joint program.  
Another way of addressing a social trap would be a strategic approach: making a 
series of small changes to the incentive and reward structure of the program, such as 
improving communications, making negative behaviors more visible to all participants, and 
similar modifications. Although no single such change would be likely to significantly mitigate 
the problem, it may be that the aggregate effect of many small changes to the program 
structure, when taken together, could have a substantial positive impact.  
Other solutions to addressing social dilemmas exist, such as building trust, exclusion 
mechanisms, assurance contracts, and many others. The choice of the best solution will 
depend on the specific circumstances surrounding the specific joint program dilemma.  
The defense acquisition system itself poses some significant challenges to 
successfully mitigating the types of problems that are inherent to joint programs and 
common infrastructure programs. When looking at the structural, strategic, and motivational 
classes of solutions to social dilemmas, it is apparent that motivational solutions, while 
attractive due to their generally lower level of effort to implement, may have little ability to 
effect change if the participants have substantial self-interest. The knowledge that “the 
complicated acquisition system generates staggering bargaining and coordination costs” 
such as “bureaucratic politics including inter-service rivalry, Joint service logrolling” (Lindsay, 
2006) make a belief in the services having low levels of self-interest seem unlikely. Strategic 
solutions are more pragmatic but rely largely on the reputation of individuals and longer term 
                                                
9 Social traps were discussed in the section Misaligned Incentives in Acquisition.  
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relationships between negotiating parties, both of which are in short supply in a military 
where “the average tenure for program management in DoD is only 18 months” (McConnell, 
Sickler, & Yang, 2004). Structural solutions thus may appear to have the most promise of 
the three classes, although convincing all of the authorities required both to implement and 
enforce new rules on all parties in a joint program context may prove to be problematic.  
The research with the system dynamics model of joint programs that is being 
developed involves the selection of some of the most promising mitigation and solution 
approaches, and modeling those approaches in the context of the joint program model. By 
assessing the ability of these solution approaches to mitigate the key adverse dynamics that 
are often present in joint programs, it will be possible to identify a set of the most promising 
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 Simulation Model for Joint Acquisition Program Dynamic 
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Future Work 
Some of the possible areas for future work will involve additional refinement and 
validation of the simulation model through review and feedback by joint acquisition domain 
experts, as well as calibration with historical program performance data. Once sufficient 
confidence in the model is gained through validation, it can be studied further to understand 
how the different key model variables are interrelated, and contribute to the causes of 
problematic behaviors. Complex surfaces, such as the one shown in Figure 9, can be 
created to give a sophisticated understanding to decision-makers as to how multiple 
variables interrelate and interact. The model can thus be used as a management decision 
aid to gain an understanding of what might occur in the future if current conditions continue 
unchanged and to explore hypothetical “what if” scenarios based on potential decisions and 
events. As the work proceeds, candidate motivational, strategic, and structural mitigations to 
the problematic dynamics of the joint program social dilemma will be developed and 
simulated to assess their effectiveness and viability, and to help develop potential new 
approaches and even policy recommendations to help improve the execution of these types 
of programs.  
Although no model can accurately predict with consistent accuracy the future states 
of a complex dynamic system such as an acquisition program, Donella Meadows (1974) 
pointed out that “this level of knowledge is less satisfactory than a perfect, precise prediction 
would be, but it is still a significant advance over the level of understanding permitted by 
current mental models.” 
Conclusion 
This paper describes the results of a preliminary investigation into the problems 
encountered by joint acquisition programs. Through interaction with joint acquisition experts, 
decision-makers, and stakeholders, a CLD now exists that represents a refined 
understanding of the problem. The CLD embodies a growing comprehension of what 
happens in joint acquisition programs and why the stakeholder programs, the JPO, and the 
developer can become trapped in behaviors that make rational sense to the participants at 
the time but can lead to diminishing returns and potentially failure for the program. It 
describes the inherent social dilemma that exists within joint programs—and provides the 
basis for a better understanding of the problem and for developing ways of mitigating it to 
minimize future joint program challenges.  
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Appendix A: Feedback Loops Discussed in Workshop 
 Loops of the Original CLD Discussed at the Problem Elaboration 
Workshop 
Loop Name Description 
R1 Stakeholder 
Bandwagon 
Low stakeholder satisfaction can lead to a desire to defect, as well as attempts to 




Lack of stakeholder support can lead to low service support, especially if the program’s 
value to the service is low. This may require a greater “marketing” effort by the JPO to 
sustain stakeholder support. 
B2 Program 
Support 
Lowered service support can undermine DoD support, requiring still more JPO 




Stakeholder support can grow as the progress of the grogram adheres to the schedule 
set forth. However, if the program falls behind schedule, stakeholders may become 





Stakeholders are especially concerned with meeting their own custom requirements. To 
the extent those requirements are not addressed, the stakeholders may insist, and the 
JPO may eventually need to accept their requirements. 
B3b Stakeholder As more of a stakeholder’s custom requirements are accepted, fairness to others may 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=




come into play. The stakeholder may become more cooperative, lowering his/her 
demands for more custom requirements. 
B4 Honey Rather 
than Vinegar 
The JPO may resist accepting custom requirements if the stakeholder becomes too 
demanding. The stakeholder may then reassess, becoming more cooperative if he 




Accepting custom requirements leads to expanded program scope. Without schedule 
relief or additional staff, this puts additional pressure on workers, potentially causing 
them to bypass quality processes, thus resulting in more rework. 
B5 De-scoping To reduce schedule pressure and try to get development back on track, the JPO may 




If sustained, excessive schedule pressure can disgruntle developers, leading to 




Delaying the schedule past the stakeholder’s need date for the capability increases 




Expanding project scope can lead to greater shared costs to each stakeholder. This 
may increase discontent and lead to greater demands to meet custom stakeholder 
requirements, especially early on. 
Appendix B: Simplified Causal Loop Diagram 
 
 Causal Loop Diagram of the Joint Program 
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